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THE FOOD STAYS 
IN THE KITCHEN 
EVERYTHING I NEEDED TO KNOW ABOUT 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION I LEARNED 
BY THE TIME I WAS NINE 
Hillel Y. Levin† 
On March 23, 1986, the following proclamation, henceforth 
known as Ordinance 7.3, was made by the Supreme Lawmaker, 
Mother: 
I am tired of finding popcorn kernels, pretzel crumbs, and 
pieces of cereal all over the family room. From now on, no 
food may be eaten outside the kitchen. 
Thereupon, litigation arose. 
 
FATHER, C.J., issued the following ruling on March 30, 1986: 
Defendant Anne, age 14, was seen carrying a glass of water into 
the family room. She was charged with violating Ordinance 7.3 
(“the Rule”). We hold that drinking water outside of the kitchen 
does not violate the Rule.  
The Rule prohibits “food” from being eaten outside of the 
kitchen. This prohibition does not extend to water, which is a bev- 
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The Supreme Lawmaker, Mother, pictured in 1983 with the citizens of the 
jurisdiction who later became the several defendants in the series of cases 
about Ordinance 7.3 reported here: Anne, Beatrice, Charlie, and Derek (in 
descending height order). 
_________________________________________________ 
erage rather than food. Our interpretation is confirmed by Web-
ster’s Dictionary, which defines food to mean, in relevant part, a 
“material consisting essentially of protein, carbohydrate, and fat 
used in the body of an organism to sustain growth, repair, and vital 
processes and to furnish energy” and “nutriment in solid form.” 
Plainly, water, which contains no protein, carbohydrate, or fat, and 
which is not in solid form, is not a food. 
Customary usage further substantiates our distinction between 
“food” and water. Ordinance 6.2, authored by the very same Su-
preme Lawmaker, declares: “[a]fter you get home from school, 
have some food and something to drink, and then do your home-
work.” This demonstrates that the Supreme Lawmaker speaks of 
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food and drink separately and is fully capable of identifying one or 
both as appropriate. After all, if “food,” as used in the Family Code, 
included beverages, then the word “drink” in Ordinance 6.2 would 
be redundant and mere surplusage. Thus, had the Supreme Law-
maker wished to prohibit beverages from being taken out of the 
kitchen, she could easily have done so by declaring that “no food or 
drink is permitted outside the kitchen.” 
Our understanding of the word “food” to exclude water is fur-
ther buttressed by the evident purpose of the Rule. The Supreme 
Lawmaker enacted the Rule as a response to the mess produced by 
solid foods. Water, even when spilled, does not produce a similar 
kind of mess.  
Some may argue that the cup from which the Defendant was 
drinking water may, if left in the family room, itself be a mess. But 
we are not persuaded. The language of the Rule speaks to the Su-
preme Lawmaker’s concern with small particles of food rather than 
to a more generalized concern with the containers in which food is 
held. A cup or other container bears a greater resemblance to other 
bric-a-brac, such as toys and backpacks, to which the Rule does not 
speak, than it does to the food spoken of in the Rule. Although we 
need not divine the Supreme Lawmaker’s reasons for such a distinc-
tion, there are at least two plausible explanations. First, it could be 
that small particles of food left around the house are more problem-
atic than the stray cup or bowl because they find their way into 
hard-to-reach places and may lead to rodent infestation. Second, it 
is possible that the Supreme Lawmaker was unconcerned with con-
tainers being left in the family room because citizens of this jurisdic-
tion have been meticulous about removing such containers.  
 
BABYSITTER SUE, J., issued the following ruling on April 12, 1986: 
Defendant Beatrice, age 12, is charged with violating Ordinance 
7.3 by drinking a beverage, to wit: orange juice, in the family 
room. 
The Defendant relies on our ruling of March 30, 1986, which 
“h[e]ld that drinking water outside of the kitchen does not violate 
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the [Ordinance],” and urges us to conclude that all beverages are 
permitted in the family room under Ordinance 7.3. While we be-
lieve this is a difficult case, we agree. As we have previously ex-
plained, the term “food” does not extend to beverages. 
Our hesitation stems not from the literal meaning of the Ordi-
nance, which strongly supports the Defendant’s claim, but rather 
from an understanding of its purpose. As we have previously stated, 
and as evidenced by the language of the Ordinance itself, the Ordi-
nance was enacted as a result of the Supreme Lawmaker’s concern 
with mess. Unlike the case with water, if the Defendant were to 
spill orange juice on the couch or rug in the family room, the mess 
would be problematic – perhaps even more so than the mess pro-
duced by crumbs of food. It is thus difficult to infer why the Su-
preme Lawmaker would choose to prohibit solid foods outside of 
the kitchen but to permit orange juice. 
Nevertheless, we are bound the plain language of the Ordinance 
and by precedent. We are confident that if the Supreme Lawmaker 
disagrees with the outcome in this case, she can change or clarify 
the law accordingly.  
 
GRANDMA, SENIOR J., issued the following ruling on May 3, 1986: 
Defendant Charlie, age 10, is charged with violating Ordinance 
7.3 by eating popcorn in the family room. The Defendant contends, 
and we agree, that the Ordinance does not apply in this case. 
Ordinance 7.3 was enacted to prevent messes outside of the 
kitchen. This purpose is demonstrated by the language of the Ordi-
nance itself, which refers to food being left “all over the family 
room” as the immediate cause of its adoption. 
Such messes are produced only when one transfers food from a 
container to his or her mouth outside of the kitchen. During that 
process – what the Ordinance refers to as “eat[ing]” – crumbs and 
other food particles often fall out of the eater’s hand and onto the 
floor or sofa.  
As the record shows, the Defendant placed all of the popcorn 
into his mouth prior to leaving the kitchen. He merely masticated 
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and swallowed while in the family room. At no time was there any 
danger that a mess would be produced. 
We are certain that there was no intent to prohibit merely the 
chewing or swallowing of food outside of the kitchen. After all, the 
Supreme Lawmaker has expressly permitted the chewing of gum in 
the family room. It would be senseless and absurd to treat gum dif-
ferently from popcorn that has been ingested prior to leaving the 
kitchen. 
If textual support is necessary to support this obvious and com-
monsensical interpretation, abundant support is available. First, the 
Ordinance prohibits food from being “eaten” outside of the kitchen. 
The term “eat” is defined to mean “to take in through the mouth as 
food: ingest, chew, and swallow in turn.” The Defendant, having 
only chewed and swallowed, did not “eat.” Further, the Ordinance 
prohibits the “eat[ing]” rather than the “bringing” of food outside of 
the kitchen; and indeed, food is often brought out of the kitchen 
and through the family room, as when school lunches are delivered 
to the front door for carpool pickup. There is no reason to treat 
food enclosed in a brown bag any differently from food enclosed 
within the Defendant’s mouth. 
Finally, if any doubt remains as to the meaning of this Ordinance 
as it pertains to the chewing and swallowing of food, we cannot 
punish the Defendant for acting reasonably and in good faith reli-
ance upon the text of the Ordinance and our past pronouncements 
as to its meaning and intent. 
 
UNCLE RICK, J., issued the following ruling on May 20, 1986: 
Defendant Charlie, age 10, is charged with violating Ordinance 
7.3 (“the Rule”) by bringing a double thick mint chocolate chip 
milkshake into the family room. 
Were I writing on a clean slate, I would surely conclude that the 
Defendant has violated the Rule. A double thick milkshake is “food” 
because it contains protein, carbohydrate, and/or fat. Further, the 
purpose of the Rule – to prevent messes – would be undermined by 
permitting a double thick milkshake to be brought into the family 
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room. Indeed, it makes little sense to treat a milkshake differently 
from a pretzel or a scoop of ice cream. 
However, I am not writing on a clean slate. Our precedents 
have now established that all beverages are permitted outside of the 
kitchen under the Rule. The Defendant relied on those precedents 
in good faith. Further, the Supreme Lawmaker has had ample op-
portunity to clarify or change the law to prohibit any or all bever-
ages from being brought out of the kitchen, and she has elected not 
to exercise that authority. I can only conclude that she is satisfied 
with the status quo. 
 
GRANDMA, SENIOR J., issued the following ruling on July 2, 1986: 
Defendant Anne, age 14, is charged with violating Ordinance 
7.3 by eating apple slices in the family room. 
As we have repeatedly held, the Ordinance pertains only to 
messy foods. Moreover, the Ordinance explicitly refers to “popcorn 
kernels, pretzel crumbs, and pieces of cereal.” Sliced apples, not 
being messy (and certainly being no worse than orange juice and 
milkshakes, which have been permitted by our prior decisions), and 
being wholly dissimilar from the crumbly foods listed in the Ordi-
nance, do not come within the meaning of the Ordinance. 
We also find it significant that the consumption of healthy foods 
such as sliced apples is a behavior that this jurisdiction supports and 
encourages. It would be odd to read the Ordinance in a way that 
would discourage such healthy behaviors by limiting them to the 
kitchen. 
 
AUNT SARAH, J., issued the following ruling on August 12, 1986: 
Defendant Beatrice, age 13, is charged with violating Ordinance 
7.3 by eating pretzels, popcorn, cereal, and birthday cake in the 
family room. Under ordinary circumstances, the Defendant would 
clearly be subject to the Ordinance. However, the circumstances 
giving rise to the Defendant’s action in this case are far from ordi-
nary. 
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The Defendant celebrated her thirteenth birthday on August 10, 
1986. For the celebration, she invited four of her closest friends to 
sleep over. During the evening, and as part of the festivities, the 
celebrants watched a movie in the family room. Chief Justice Father 
provided those present with drinks and snacks, including the afore-
said pretzels, popcorn, and cereal, for consumption during the 
movie-watching. Father admonished the Defendant to clean up after 
the movie, and there is no evidence in the record suggesting that 
the Defendant failed to do so. 
We frankly concede that the Defendant’s action were violative 
of the plain meaning of the Ordinance. However, given the special 
and unique nature of the occasion, the fact that Father, a represen-
tative of the Supreme Lawmaker – as well as of this Court – implic-
itly approved of the Defendant’s actions, and the apparent efforts of 
the Defendant in upholding the spirit of the Ordinance by cleaning 
up after her friends, we believe that the best course of action is to 
release the Defendant.  
In light of the growing confusion in the interpretation of this 
ambiguous Ordinance, we urge the Supreme Lawmaker to exercise 
her authority to clarify and/or change the law if and as she deems it 
appropriate.  
 
FATHER, C.J., issued the following ruling on September 17, 1986: 
Defendant Derek, age 9, was charged with violating Ordinance 
7.3 (“the Rule”) by eating pretzels, potato chips, popcorn, a bagel 
with cream cheese, cottage cheese, and a chocolate bar in the family 
room. 
The Defendant argues that our precedents have clearly estab-
lished a pattern permitting food to be eaten in the family room so 
long as the eater cleans up any mess. He further maintains that it 
would be unjust for this Court to punish him after having permitted 
past actions such as drinking water, orange juice, and a milkshake, 
as well as swallowing popcorn, eating apple slices, and eating pret-
zels, popcorn, and cereal on a special occasion. The Defendant 
avers that there is no rational distinction between his sister’s eating 
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foods in the family room during a movie on a special occasion and 
his eating foods in the family room during a weekly television show. 
We agree. The citizens of this jurisdiction look to the rulings of 
this Court, as well as to general practice, to understand their rights 
and obligations as citizens. In the many months since the Rule was 
originally announced, the cumulative rulings of this Court on the 
subject would signify to any citizen that, whatever the technical lan-
guage of the Rule, the real Rule is that they must clean up after eat-
ing any food outside of the kitchen. To draw and enforce any other 
line now would be arbitrary and, as such, unjust.  
 
On November 4, 1986, the following proclamation, henceforth 
known as The New Ordinance 7.3, was made by the Supreme 
Lawmaker, Mother: 
Over the past few months, I have found empty cups, or-
ange juice stains, milkshake spills, slimy spots of unknown 
origin, all manner of crumbs, melted chocolate, and icing 
from cake in the family room. I thought I was clear the first 
time! And you’ve all had a chance to show me that you 
could use your common sense and clean up after your-
selves. So now let me be clearer: No food, gum, or drink 
of any kind, on any occasion or in any form, is permitted in 
the family room. Ever. Seriously. I mean it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
